Know your lot before it reaches the line.

Shortages and obsolescence push electronics manufacturing services (EMS) providers and original equipment manufacturers toward independent distributors and brokers, where suspect counterfeit and nonconforming parts circulate. The question a quality or purchasing manager then faces is specific to one lot: what evidence is needed to justify trusting this particular lot, from this source, for this application?

ERAI, Inc. reported that 85.2% of the parts reported to it in 2024 and 81.1% in 2025 had not appeared in earlier reports. A lookup in an incident database therefore cannot by itself show that a given lot is sound.

These figures come from voluntary reports. They provide industry context; they do not measure market-wide counterfeit incidence and do not test the methodology described on this site.

Turnaround is a management target. Independent-channel offers are often time-limited, so a lot assessment is scoped in two stages:

1. document-review (L0) findings and the verification plan are targeted within two business days of receipt of a complete evidence package;
2. the post-laboratory update and recommendation within two business days of receipt of the laboratory report.

Laboratory lead time is outside the company’s control and would be stated separately in each proposal. These targets are management assumptions to be confirmed by time records in the first engagements.

The L0 findings and verification plan are the first deliverable of the lot assessment. The included post-laboratory update covers a laboratory report received within the period stated in the engagement letter. If the client decides not to test, or no report is received within that period, the engagement closes on the L0 record: the recommended disposition is stated on the available evidence, and the Digital Component Passport (DCP) records that the lot was not tested.

A synthetic example of the record shows its structure and its limits.

Until the scoring model has been through a validation program whose acceptance criteria are fixed in advance, services would be limited to documented expert review. Any numerical score would be shown as experimental, with its rationale, and the client would acknowledge that status in writing before work starts.

• No accuracy, detection-rate or savings claims.
• No authenticity certification at any stage; the client decides acceptance.
• Laboratory testing is ordered and paid for by the client directly with the laboratory.

Component distribution or brokering, a company-owned test laboratory, defense-related work, civil aviation and space. Software tools and methodology licenses are a conditional later phase, described on the roadmap.

CILM treats risk not as a fixed property of a part number or a supplier but as a consequence of how much verifiable evidence exists about the provenance and history of a specific lot.

Five factors are considered: supply-channel structure, counterfeit exposure frequency, verification quality, documentation integrity, and component criticality and lifecycle. Its scoring core, the Composite Integrity Risk Score (CIRS), maps them to one of four risk tiers with a separate confidence level. The tier and the application’s criticality indicate a recommended verification depth, from document review (L0) to destructive laboratory analysis (L3). Laboratory results update the record.

The output is always a risk tier, evidence confidence, a recommended verification depth and a recommended disposition — never an authenticity determination. The client makes the acceptance decision.

• It does not certify components or suppliers.
• It does not replace accredited testing.
• It does not determine authenticity.
• It does not constitute an industry standard. Its L0–L3 and C0–C4 scales are its own, not scales defined by SAE or IPC.
• Until validated, a CIRS score is experimental and is not a calibrated probability that a part is counterfeit.

Mandatory client requirements, critical contradictions in the evidence and unresolved lot identity are escalation conditions that a favorable composite score cannot offset. Where the evidence cannot support a defensible recommendation, the report names the unresolved issue and recommends quarantine, more evidence, further testing or rejection.

A test that detects no anomaly does not by itself establish unbroken provenance or suitability for every application. Likewise, complete documentation does not by itself establish the physical condition or fitness of the parts.

• White paper on Zenodo: doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19657865
• Three-part series in Supply Chain Management Review: Insights

The planned practice would serve U.S. civilian manufacturers only: electronics manufacturing services providers, industrial and energy-equipment manufacturers, and medical-device manufacturers and their contract manufacturers. Independent distributors and testing laboratories would be later licensees in Phase 3, which is conditional.

Excluded now and in the future: defense-related work and programs, and government contracts. Also excluded: civil aviation and space. Requests from these sectors will be declined.

No services to persons located in Russia or Belarus. These are company decisions, adopted in addition to legal requirements.

• Restricted-party and sanctions screening of the client and named parties, including ownership.
• Confirmation that the work is civilian and involves no defense articles or controlled defense data.
• An engagement letter setting out the advisory nature and limits of the service.
• Agreement on data handling.
• Outside counsel reviews export-control and sanctions questions for the planned data flows before the first contract.

Management-system certification, laboratory accreditation, testing of a specific lot and a customer’s approval of a supplier are different things and are never described as interchangeable. Testing is performed by the laboratory the client selects, within that laboratory’s confirmed scope of accreditation. Advice does not replace the client’s acceptance decision.

Client files would be stored in access-controlled cloud storage with logging, backup and restoration testing. Lot records separate client-owned records, licensed third-party data and the assessor’s analysis. Reuse of client data for any other purpose requires a documented rights basis.

The practice would not sell the parts it reviews. The client chooses the laboratory; any referral fee would be disclosed in writing; no compensation would depend on the outcome of an assessment.

Software and licenses would be added only when all four conditions are met, each with its own evidence:

1. a validation report whose outcome meets acceptance criteria fixed in advance;
2. five signed design-partner agreements;
3. MVP formally accepted by the design partners;
4. a founder decision to enable the program.

The planned services do not depend on the software.

Alexander L. Litvin has worked in electronic-component supply since 1998, sourcing components through authorized and independent channels for industrial customers, including end-of-life and hard-to-find parts. His practical focus is integrity and lifecycle risk: evaluating sources, suppliers, lot-specific evidence, verification needs and component obsolescence.

He is the author of the Component Integrity and Lifecycle Management (CILM) methodology and its scoring core, the Composite Integrity Risk Score (CIRS), and of a three-part series on component-level integrity risk in Supply Chain Management Review. He is an IEEE Senior Member.

Planned role

Founder and principal methodologist of the planned company: methodology governance and validation, review of complex or high-criticality assessments, supplier-qualification design and professional training. The planned company is the vehicle through which he intends to continue this work in the United States.

CILM and these planned activities are independent personal initiatives; see theindependence statement.